The Comparative Study of Economic Growth and Structure by Lloyd G. Reynolds
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Comparative Study Of Economic Growth And Structure




Chapter Title: Supplementary Memoranda - Notes on Comparative Analysis
of National Economies
Chapter Author: Lloyd G. Reynolds
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c4422




The Sfrategy of Comparative Study
Economic teaching and research in the United States have suffered from
a myopic preoccupation with Anglo-American ideas, institutions, and
problems. From a scientific standpoint, it seems self-evident that sound
generalization about economic behavior requires examination of a wide
range of national economies. We can have, in effect, the benefit of twenty
or thirty laboratory experiments instead of only one or two. This "geo-
graphical stretching" of the scope of economics is at least as necessary
as the "historical stretching" that is rightly urged by historians and others.
In grappling with policy problems, too, we can gain wisdom by studying
the way in which these problems have developed and been met in other
countries. Many of the issues that are important in the American economy
are important in other industrial countries as well, and some are virtually
world-wide in scope. Examples come readily to mind: the possible infla-
tionary consequences of strong unionism; the effectiveness of monetary
policy in promoting stability of prices and employment; the relation of
tax structures to economic incentives and economic growth; and the
proper balance between agricultural and industrial prices and incomes.
While I am strongly in favor of comparative study, I feel that the
"comparative economic systems" approach, which has been fashionable
in recent decades, has probably done more to retard scientific progress
than to advance it. This is not just because most work in this area has been
qualitative and unanalytical. It is because the effort at a botanical classi-
fication of economies as "capitalist," "socialist," etc., is itself misguided.
The economies ordinarily labeled as "capitalist" in such schema are dis-
similar in many important respects, while economies that fail in different
boxes—such as the United States and the U.S.S.R.—may show strong
resemblances. A classification of economies based on output levels
("developed," "semideveloped," "underdeveloped") or on rate of growth
("stagnant," "growing," "rapidly growing") makes more sense but is still
not very useful. Development is a matter of degree, and there are no sharp
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developed," but this does not mean that they are structurally similar.
I conclude that the effort at simple categorization of total economies is a
blind alley, and that progress must be sought in other directions.
In curricular terms, I believe that progress lies through a massive
infusion of foreign data and experience into the standard functional
branches of economics—money and banking, public finance, industrial
organization, labor economics, and the rest. Every course in the curricu-
lum, at least at the graduate level, should be implicitly comparative. In
research terms, progress lies through developing sharp hypotheses about
selected aspects of economic behavior and testing these hypotheses with
quantitative data from as many national economies as possible. In the
present formative stage of economics, qualitative description should not
be entirely excluded. Problems which can be framed in quantitative terms,
however, give greater promise of definite results which may be added on
to those of other studies using comparable data and techniques.
A Word About Data
There would probably be widespread agreement on the types of national
economic data that are desirable. If we had for each country of the world
the economic statistics now available for the United States, and if these
series extended backward for a hundred years, we should be in an econo-
paradise. The actual situation is, of course, much less satisfactory.
Large gaps appear in the current data for most countries of the world.
The gaps widen rapidly as one proceeds backward in time. Problems of
reliability and comparability are very serious. Conclusions drawn from
such data require extensive footnoting and qualification.
One could argue that the first need is for improvement of national
statistics, that effort should be concentrated on data accumulation, and
that until much more has been done on this front, research efforts should
be deferred. There is a good deal to this, but it overlooks the reciprocal
relation between research and data accumulation. Framing hypotheses
helps to determine what types of data are most useful. Aggressive research
often develops new sources of data and new approaches to measurement
problems. Research on very crude data may stimulate the production of
more refined measurements and their subsequent maintenance on a cur-
rent basis. The proper conclusion is not that research should be deferred,
but rather that we must put up for the time being with wobbly data and
tentative conclusions.
Accumulation of national statistics on a mass scale is the task of
national governments, aided by the specialized agencies of the UN and
by other intergovernmental bodies. But a private research group could
do useful work in suggesting improvements in the quality and compara-
bility of national statistics, particularly in economic accounting. There
should be some place in the United States where a small group of Amen-
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years. They might be joined from time to time by experts from other
countries with advanced systems of economic accounting, such as Britain
and Scandinavian countries. The center could also provide internship and
training services for economic statisticians from the less developed nations,
and thus have a gradual but cumulative impact on the content of statistical
work in these countries. The objective would be not to do substantive
research or even to accumulate large amounts of data, but simply to work
toward standardization of concepts and methods of measurement. An
outstanding example of the utility of this sort of work was the National
Accounts Research Unit, directed by Richard Stone at Cambridge Uni-
versity, which developed a uniform system of accounts subsequently taken
over and maintained currently by the OEEC countries.
Key Issues for Comparative Study
It was argued earlier that any problem in economics can and should be
analyzed on a comparative or multinational basis. Thus to ask, "What
subjects are most deserving of comparative study?" amounts simply to
asking, "What problems are most important in present-day economics?"
Individual answers to this are bound to differ. I have selected for emphasis
here a number of issues in two broad areas: (1) the evolution of national
economies through time, and (2) the structure of national economies,
by which I mean essentially the mechanism of resource allocation. This
selection of issues is deliberately incomplete and does not mean that I
regard other problems as unimportant.
The Evolution of Economies Through Time
This is an area often designated as "development economics" or "growth
economics." "Development" has a connotation of emphasis on low-income
economies, while "growth" suggests a focus on total output and other
national aggregates. My terminology is intended to cover detailed as well
as aggregative changes, and to leave the door open for a certain amount
of institutional description along with statistical measurement.
This area might also be termed "sophisticated economic history." It is
significant that the most important generalizations about long-run change
in the American economy have been developed, not by economic his-
torians, but by economic theorists and statisticians. I have in mind the
work of Kuznets, Schumpeter, Burns, Abramovitz, Fabricant, Stigler, and
a number of others. One can make a good case that this is the new shape
of economic history and that it is destined over the long run to supersede
conventional economic history in the graduate curriculum.
The issues that impress me as most interesting are listed below in
question form. This is not meant to imply that they are entirely unan-
swered. Much obviously has been done, most notably by Simon Kuznets.
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would run far beyond the limits of a brief paper.
Growth of total and per capita national output. What have been the
long-term rates of increase, country by country, in aggregate and per
capita output?
Can inter-country differences in growth rates be related to differences
in rate of population increase, rate of capital accumulation, and other
quantitative variables?
Within a particular country, is there typically a period of accelerating
growth, followed by stable and perhaps eventually declining rates of
growth? Is there evidence for Rostow's "take-off point" hypothesis or for
the "mature economy" hypothesis?
Capital accumulation in relation to growth. What has been the course
of gross and net investment, relative to GNP and NNP, in various coun-
tries over long periods?
How does one account for inter-country differences in investment
levels, and for changes within the same country over time?
What is the relative importance of government saving, business saving,
and personal saving as sources of investment finance in various countries,
and what trends are observable over time?
What evidence is available on average and marginal capital-output
ratios, and on changes in these over time?
Internal changes accompanying aggregative growth. What generaliza-
tions can be drawn about the changing importance of various output
sectors as total output expands? The secular decline of agriculture is
well established. Are there other trends of equal reliability?
Is there a "normal sequence" in the growth of manufacturing in an
economy? Do certain industries typically lead or is there wide variation
of leading industries?
Do changes in relative labor and capital supplies in the course of
development have the effects that they "should have" on production
methods, productivity ratios, factor prices, and labor-capital shares?
What are the long-run tendencies in the size distribution of personal
incomes? Is there support for the hypothesis of gradual leveling of incomes
in mature economies?
Other questions about long-run change. What has been the course of
the price level in various countries over long periods? Is there a tendency
toward chronic inflation under economic planning, whether of the Soviet
type or the looser "development program" type? Is there evidence that
the Western industrial economies are also more biased than formerly
toward secular inflation?
Do developing economies show any regular pattern of change in their
debtor-creditor position, the volume and composition of exports and
imports, and other aspects of their international economic relations?
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The Allocative Mechanism
The term "structure of a national economy" can be used in a variety of
senses. It can mean the complex of physical input-output relationships.
It can mean the financial mechanism through which monetary changes are
transmitted to the productive system and vice versa. It can mean the
parameters of the key equations in an aggregative economic model. Each
of these is obviously an interesting and important object of research.
I use the term here in the traditional sense of the arrangements for
pricing and allocation of productive resources and outputs. More specifi-
cally, my emphasis is on the mixture and interaction of "market" and
"administrative" controls. "Structure" in this sense is believed to have
important effects on the operating efficiency of an economy, the level of
welfare which it yields, the nature of its short-term fluctuations, and the
rate of capital accumulation and output growth.
I have tried to select a few aspects of economic structure which seem
intrinsically important and on which one might hope to marshal quanti-
tative evidence.
Inter-industry distribution of resources under private enterprise. It is
often said that some capitalist economies are more competitive, flexible,
and market-controlled than others (France, for example, is contrasted
with the United States). What quantitative indicators can be devised
which would lend greater precision to such statements?
In most economies the marginal product of labor is substantially lower
in agriculture than in industry. How can one explain the persistence of
this phenomenon over long periods? How can one explain inter-country
differences in the gap between agricultural and urban productivity?
Is there any secular tendency toward over- or under-allocation of
resources to other sectors? (Retail trade, for example, is allegedly over-
manned in many countries.)
Schumpeter and others have advanced hypotheses about the relation
between industrial structure (age of an industry, size of establishments,
competitive or monopolistic product market) and the technical pro-
gressiveness of the industry. What can be done with this problem from a
quantitative standpoint?
Does the distribution of the employed population among major occu-
pational strata conform broadly to competitive principles? Or are there
serious barriers to upward mobility, leading to distorted allocation? How
substantial are inter-country differences in this respect, and what are the
trends over time?
Resource use in the public sector of capitalist economies. How great
is the inter-country variation in the scope of the public sector, i.e. the
percentage of national product produced under government auspices?
Is there a secular tendency toward expansion of the public sector?
Are there systematic differences in the price, output, and investment
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private enterprises in the same industries?
Is there any tendency toward over- or under-allocation of resources to
public industries providing services on a nonprice basis? Are public
services "starved" or "swollen"?
Resource allocation and use under central planning. What has been the
broad allocation of output between private consumption, communal con-
sumption, and investment in Soviet-type economies? What are the major
differences from capitalist economies, and what have been the significant
trends over time?
Can one say that agriculture is generally "exploited" in these econo-
mies? What are the mechanisms used and how effectively have they
operated?
What is the significance of cost and price calculations as a basis for,
or an aid to, administrative controls over production? Examples would be
use of cost calculations in decisions about production methods and in
control of production efficiency, and use of retail prices as a rationing
device and conceivably as an indicator of consumer preference.
What are the significant similarities and differences between the opera-
tion of labor markets in Soviet-type and in unplanned economies? Does
the wage mechanism operate in substantially the same fashion? Are there
differences in the barriers to penetration of the upper occupational strata?
How does the blend of market and administrative controls in the
Yugoslav economy differ from that in the Soviet model? What difference
does this make in the day-to-day operation of the economy? What light
does experience in Yugoslavia and elsewhere shed on the feasibility of
"market socialism"?
Development programming in low-income economies. What is the
scope and logic of the "five-year plans" and "development programs"
now used in many countries of Asia and Latin America? Do they contain
an appreciable element of central planning in the Russian sense? Have
these programs had an observable effect on inter-industry resource allo-
cation, productivity, saving and investment levels, and rate of increase in
output? Perhaps more properly, why have some national programs had
such effects and others not?
A Comment on Research Needs and Strategy
The enormous scope of these topics illustrates the point made at the
outset, i.e. comparative economic analysis is not a branch or subdivision
of economics. It is a point of view, a way of approaching any significant
problem in economics.
The range of important problems deserving comparative study is very
wide. The available data are quite crude for most countries and will
improve only gradually over the decades to come. Few talented people are
exploiting even the data presently available. On many problems there has
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main need at present is for more exploratory studies of a rather broad,
rough, and preliminary character. It is a great contribution at this stage
simply to lay out techniques for attacking significant problems, to expose
major inadequacies in the data, and to develop hypotheses that may prove
useful for subsequent work. "It is better to ask some of the questions than
to have all of the answers."
The fact that quantitative analysis and comparison of national econo-
mies are still in such formative stages argues for a large measure of indi-
vidual entrepreneurship over the foreseeable future. It is important that
more good economists be persuaded to undertake this kind of work and
that they approach it with a variety of techniques and substantive interests.
They should be encouraged by research support on a scale adequate to
their personal interests and needs. It would seem profitable to link their
efforts through a standing research committee under proper institutional
auspices. In addition to exchanging information on their own plans and
activities, the members of such a committee could help to "develop and
plant" research ideas in promising locations and to recruit new talent into
the field.
It may be that something would be gained by going beyond this and
bringing several able scholars together for continuing work in the same
physical location. This is not an issue of principle but a practical question
which could only be decided on the basis of answers to a number of
sub-questions, including:
1. In what areas, if any, have we reached the stage—both in terms of
theoretical structures and availability of data—at which the main need is
facilities for large-scale data control and processing? (Economies of scale
in social science research seem to be mainly associated with handling of
mass data.)
2. Who would be willing to manage such a center? Would the reduction
of the manager's own research effectiveness because of administrative
duties be more than offset by an increase in the productivity of his
colleagues?
3. Where would the center be located? Could scholars of the desired
quality be persuaded to leave their present locations and settle in the
new one? And would the gain in efficiency more than offset the dislocation
costs?
4. Related to this, what are the advantages of university as against
non-university locations? (I must confess to some preference for univer-
sity locations, partly because a graduate school provides a ready supply
of research apprentices, and partly because of the advantages of exposing
one's half-formulated hypotheses and conclusions to a critical audience of
students and colleagues.)
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able to scholars throughout the United States and in other countries?
6. What assurance of continuity in financing would be desirable and
feasible? (The prevalent practice of financing supposedly long-term ven-
tures through short-term foundation grants presents obvious difficulties
to all concerned.)
These questions and others would need to be faced realistically in order
to appraise the feasibility of the center idea. Certainly a good deal of
additional thought and planning would be necessary to arrive at an in-
formed conclusion.
In the long run, the main hope lies in interesting good young economists
in applying refined theoretical and statistical methods to comparative
economic analysis. One way of doing this is through research seminars
or workshops for advanced graduate students. I have developed at Yale
a "Workshop in National Economic Organization" with precisely this
purpose in mind. The group consists each year of 15to20 second- and
third-year graduate students, about half of whom are usually from foreign
countries. The workshop technique has proven feasible and stimulating,
and a number of student projects have developed into thesis subjects. The
main problem is that foreign field work is usually desirable, and this
requires financing. I consider foundation support in this direction even
more important than support for the work of mature scholars. A small
investment in an able young man can yield remarkably high returns.
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